{"id":30429,"date":"2023-10-15T22:54:38","date_gmt":"2023-10-15T20:54:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/intervista.al\/web\/?p=30429"},"modified":"2023-10-15T22:54:40","modified_gmt":"2023-10-15T20:54:40","slug":"befasi-strategjike-apo-kurth-strategjik-nga-agron-berdaj","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/intervista.al\/web\/2023\/10\/befasi-strategjike-apo-kurth-strategjik-nga-agron-berdaj\/","title":{"rendered":"Befasi strategjike apo kurth strategjik&#8230;Nga Agron Berdaj"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Ajo q\u00eb ka b\u00ebr\u00eb m\u00eb tep\u00ebr p\u00ebrshtypie n\u00eb konfliktin mes Izraelit dhe Hamas-it, n\u00eb Rripin e Gaz\u00ebs, nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb lufta mes tyre, por befasia me t\u00eb cil\u00ebn nisi ajo. Shteti i Izraelit ka lindur, \u00ebsht\u00eb mbrojtur dhe zhvilluar p\u00ebrmes luftrave me shtetet e rajonit. Kjo nuk p\u00ebrb\u00ebn ndonj\u00eb gj\u00eb t\u00eb re. Ajo q\u00eb ka t\u00ebrhequr v\u00ebmendjen, \u00ebsht\u00eb se si u realizua nj\u00eb befasi e plot\u00eb n\u00eb nivelin taktik, operativo-strategjik, politik, diplomatik dhe teknologjik. Ishte nj\u00eb nd\u00ebrthurje e t\u00eb gjith\u00eb element\u00ebve q\u00eb p\u00ebrb\u00ebjn\u00eb befasin\u00eb: mashtrimi, diversioni, desinformimi, imazhet kontradiktore, etj. Mjetet e p\u00ebrdorura nga Hamas ishin sa klasike, aq edhe moderne, kur armatimi dhe teknologjia e luft\u00ebs jan\u00eb sofistikuar.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">P\u00ebrgjumja e Sh\u00ebrbimit t\u00eb Zbulimit Ushtarak, ashtu edhe e MOSSAD-it, duket e pabesueshme. Ndoshta, sistemi i siguris\u00eb s\u00eb Izraelit mendonte m\u00eb tep\u00ebr p\u00ebr fundin e luft\u00ebs, t\u00eb imponuar nga kund\u00ebrshtari i tij, se sa p\u00ebr fillimin e saj. Ata mendonin p\u00ebr nj\u00eb hart\u00eb dhe gjeopolitik\u00eb t\u00eb re n\u00eb rajon. Nuk e parashikuan si duhet t\u00eb sotmen tragjike, por jetuan me mendimin tek e ardhmja, p\u00ebr nj\u00eb histori t\u00eb re t\u00eb Izraelit, sipas s\u00eb cil\u00ebs do t\u2019i impononte armikut jo nj\u00eb zgjidhje t\u00eb p\u00ebrkoh\u00ebshme, por p\u00ebrfundimtare.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Siguria dhe mbrojtja e Izraelit jan\u00eb vler\u00ebsuar nd\u00ebr m\u00eb t\u00eb mirat n\u00eb bot\u00eb n\u00eb pikpamje t\u00eb teknologjis\u00eb moderne t\u00eb luft\u00ebs, organizimit ushtarak, p\u00ebrgatitjes s\u00eb vendit p\u00ebr luft\u00eb, etj. Sistemi i mbrojtjes anti-raket\u00eb, i quajturi \u201cKupola e Hekurt\u201d, i instaluar nga Izraeli rreth dhjet\u00eb vjet m\u00eb par\u00eb, ishte pretenduar p\u00ebr siguri pothuajse absolute, e cila, sipas ekspert\u00ebve t\u00eb fush\u00ebs, shkon nga 90 deri n\u00eb 96 p\u00ebrqind. Praktika e deri parafillimit t\u00eb k\u00ebsaj lufte, i v\u00ebrtetonte tregues t\u00eb till\u00eb.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Por \u00e7\u2019treguan zhvillimet operacionale t\u00eb dat\u00ebs 7 Tetor? Sipas t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave af\u00ebrsisht t\u00eb sigurta, Hamas, n\u00eb barrazhin fillestar prej 20 minutash, l\u00ebshoi rreth 5000 raketa. Brenda k\u00ebsaj kohe, \u201cKupola e Hekurt\u201d l\u00ebshoi 2500 kund\u00ebr-raketa. Nuk mund t\u00eb l\u00ebshonte m\u00eb shum\u00eb, \u00e7ka do t\u00eb thot\u00eb se arriti mas\u00ebn e ngopjes pik\u00ebrisht me k\u00ebt\u00eb num\u00ebr p\u00ebr k\u00ebt\u00eb nj\u00ebsi kohe. Me sa duket, Hamas ka studjuar e vler\u00ebsuar pik\u00ebrisht k\u00ebt\u00eb handikap t\u00eb \u201cKupol\u00ebs s\u00eb Hekurt\u201d, prandaj sakrifikoi sasin\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb arritur efektivitetin. Kjo flet se \u201custallar\u00ebt\u201d e Hamas e kishin hetuar k\u00ebt\u00eb handikap, \u00e7ka iu dha mund\u00ebsin\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb arritur befasin\u00eb strategjike. Nga ana tjet\u00ebr, edhe vet\u00eb \u201custallar\u00ebt\u201d e Izraelit e kishin pikasur k\u00ebt\u00eb kufizim t\u00eb \u201cKupol\u00ebs s\u00eb Hekurt\u201d, prandaj prej dy vjet\u00ebsh po eksperimentonin kalimin nga sistemi kund\u00ebr-raket\u00eb, n\u00eb sistemin operacional me rreze lazer. Sigurisht q\u00eb besohet se \u00ebsht\u00eb e vetmja zgjidhje n\u00eb kushtet kur Izraeli gjendet n\u00eb rrethim t\u00eb plot\u00eb zjarri nga t\u00eb gjitha an\u00ebt: Izraelin, n\u00eb nj\u00eb rast hipotetik mund ta sulmoj\u00eb me forca vet\u00ebm Egjipti, nd\u00ebrsa Jordania, Siria, Libani, Irani, Hezbollahu, etj, mund ta sulmojn\u00eb vet\u00ebm me zjarr.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Por, at\u00ebher\u00eb, \u00e7far\u00eb ngjau q\u00eb forcat terroriste t\u00eb Hamas penetruan disa kilometra n\u00eb teritorin e shtetit izraelit pa asnj\u00eb penges\u00eb?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Analiza e faktorit t\u00eb befasis\u00eb strategjike, apo taktiko-operative, edhe n\u00eb luft\u00ebn e dit\u00ebve t\u00eb fundit, mes Izraelit dhe Hamasit, b\u00ebhet m\u00eb mir\u00eb n\u00ebse do t\u00eb rikujtojm\u00eb t\u00eb gjitha luft\u00ebrat Izraelito-Arabe. Dhe ato nuk jan\u00eb pak, duke nisur nga \u201cLufta e Izraelit me pes\u00eb shtete Arabe n\u00eb vitin 1948\u201d, \u201cLufta e Yon Kipurit\u201d, \u201cLufta e Tetorit\u201d, \u201cLufta Izraelito-Arabe\u201d n\u00eb vitin 1973 dhe \u201cLufta e kat\u00ebrt Arabe\u201d, n\u00eb t\u00eb cilat mashtrimi strategjik ka arritur nivelet m\u00eb t\u00eb larta, t\u00eb krahasuara me mashtrimin strategjik n\u00eb \u201cOperacionin Barbarossa\u201d n\u00eb vitin 1941, kur ushtria gjermane sulmoi Bashkimin Sovjetik, apo Operacioni Aleat i Zbarkimit n\u00eb Normandi.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">N\u00eb luftrat e m\u00ebsip\u00ebrme Izraelito-Arabe, mashtrimi strategjik, nga m\u00ebnyra e organizimit, paraqiti tipare dhe ve\u00e7ori nga nj\u00ebra luft\u00eb n\u00eb tjetr\u00ebn. Por, n\u00eb p\u00ebrmbajtje, mashtrimi strategjik \u00ebsht\u00eb sintez\u00eb e bashk\u00ebrendimit dhe bashk\u00ebveprimit t\u00eb t\u00eb gjith\u00eb faktor\u00ebve shtet\u00ebror\u00eb, doktrinave dhe strategjis\u00eb s\u00eb luft\u00ebs, diplomacis\u00eb, element\u00ebve t\u00eb siguris\u00eb, shkall\u00ebs s\u00eb p\u00ebrgatitjes s\u00eb popullit, ushtris\u00eb, ekonomis\u00eb dhe terrenit p\u00ebr luft\u00eb. N\u00ebse k\u00ebto element\u00eb nuk funksionojn\u00eb n\u00eb bllok, kund\u00ebrshtari e siguron befasin\u00eb strategjike duke dep\u00ebrtuar n\u00eb pik\u00ebn m\u00eb t\u00eb dob\u00ebt, atje ku ekuilibrat n\u00eb shtetin kund\u00ebrshtar jan\u00eb t\u00eb prishura.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Befasia strategjike n\u00eb Luft\u00ebn e vitit 1973, mes Egjiptit dhe aleat\u00ebve t\u00eb tij kund\u00ebr Izraelit, u arrit p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb analiz\u00ebs s\u00eb gabuar t\u00eb shtabeve ushtarake dhe qeveritare izraelite: fuqia ajrore e kund\u00ebrshtarit ishte vler\u00ebsuar e pamjaftueshme p\u00ebr t\u00eb nisur luft\u00ebn. Nj\u00eb analiz\u00eb e till\u00eb ishte kthyer n\u00eb dogm\u00eb srtategjike. Sipas llogarive t\u00eb izraelit\u00ebve, ushtria egjiptiane nuk kishte numurin e duhur t\u00eb aeroplan\u00ebve dhe t\u00eb pilot\u00ebve p\u00ebr t\u00eb realizuar sulmin. Sipas llogaritjeve t\u00eb thata t\u00eb Izraelit, Egjipti do mund t\u00eb b\u00ebhej gati p\u00ebr luft\u00eb vet\u00ebm n\u00eb vitin 1975! Me k\u00ebt\u00eb logjik\u00eb, llogarit\u00eb e tyre ishin t\u00eb sakta, por i pasakt\u00eb ishte fakti se egjiptian\u00ebt i siguruan me p\u00ebrpar\u00ebsi avion\u00ebt dhe pilot\u00ebt dy vjet m\u00eb p\u00ebrpara, pra, n\u00eb vitin 1973 dhe pik\u00ebrisht at\u00ebher\u00eb ata filluan luft\u00ebn ndaj Izraelit, duke e gjetur at\u00eb n\u00eb befasi.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Mb\u00ebshtetja e suksesit vet\u00ebm n\u00eb shmangien e befasis\u00eb s\u00eb kund\u00ebrshtarit n\u00eb momentet e para, pra, vet\u00ebm te nj\u00eb faktor i luft\u00ebs, \u00ebsht\u00eb e gabuar, aq m\u00eb tep\u00ebr kur ky faktor hiperbolizohet, duke u kthyer n\u00eb nj\u00eb nocion strategjik t\u00eb pashoq\u00ebruar me element\u00eb t\u00eb tjer\u00eb bashk\u00ebplot\u00ebsues. Mbivler\u00ebsimi nga izraelit\u00ebt, i vij\u00ebs mbrojt\u00ebse \u201cBar-Lev\u201d n\u00eb Kanalin e Suezit, si nj\u00eb fiksacion strategjik, ndikoi n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb drastike n\u00eb vendimmarrjen politike dhe ushtarake. Vler\u00ebsimi i komandave ushtarake se n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb vij\u00eb do t\u00eb arrihej t\u00eb ndalej sulmi i kund\u00ebrshtarit p\u00ebr nj\u00eb koh\u00eb t\u00eb mjaftueshme q\u00eb do t\u00eb mund\u00ebsonte mobilizimin e p\u00ebrgjithsh\u00ebm ushtarak t\u00eb Izraelit, nuk doli me shum\u00eb sukses, duke e vendosur ushtrin\u00eb izraelite n\u00eb kushte t\u00eb disfavorshme q\u00eb n\u00eb fillimin e luft\u00ebs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Befasia strategjike n\u00eb Luft\u00ebn e V\u00ebndeve Arabe kund\u00ebr Izraelit n\u00eb vitin 1967, ka disa tipare t\u00eb tjera. K\u00ebto lidhen me mosnjohjen si duhet t\u00eb nivelit ekonomik t\u00eb shtetit kund\u00ebrshtar, t\u00eb reformave ushtarake q\u00eb ata kishin b\u00ebr\u00eb, si n\u00eb organizim, n\u00eb strategji dhe m\u00ebnyrat e t\u00eb luftuarit, duke menduar se kund\u00ebrshtar\u00ebt e tyre kishin mbetur te format e luft\u00ebs guerrilie, nd\u00ebrkoh\u00eb q\u00eb ata zbatonin teorit\u00eb e luft\u00ebs moderne.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Humbja e befasis\u00eb strategjike n\u00eb luft\u00ebn e tanishme mes Izraelit dhe terrorist\u00ebve t\u00eb Hamasit, mund t\u00eb shpjegohet edhe n\u00eb nj\u00eb plan m\u00eb t\u00eb gjer\u00eb. N\u00eb kushtet kur Ushtria e Izraelit zot\u00ebron teknologji dhe armatime t\u00eb sofistikuara dhe organizim t\u00eb p\u00ebrsosur ushtarak, ku sensor\u00ebt dhe kamerat e v\u00ebzhgimit kan\u00eb arritur t\u00eb jen\u00eb pjes\u00eb e kompletit t\u00eb luft\u00ebtarit, kur ekzistojn\u00eb breza mbrojtjeje t\u00eb mir\u00ebfortifikuara, etj., at\u00ebher\u00eb shkaqet e kapjes n\u00eb befasi strategjike duhen k\u00ebrkuar m\u00eb s\u00eb shumti te faktori subjektiv, te lidershipi shtet\u00ebror e ushtarak. Fakt \u00ebsht\u00eb q\u00eb, m\u00ebnyra e qeverisjes, politika, diplomacia, sistemi i siguris\u00eb dhe i mbrojtjes i Izraelit, n\u00eb vitet e fundit, kan\u00eb pasqyruar problematika, t\u00eb cilat u shfryt\u00ebzuan nga kund\u00ebrshtari p\u00ebr t\u00eb siguruar befasin\u00eb e luft\u00ebs. Qeverisja me frym\u00eb autoritare, prirjet pacifiste, nj\u00eb far\u00eb m\u00ebndjemadh\u00ebsie dhe n\u00ebnvleft\u00ebsimi i armikut, e t\u00eb tjera, dukej se koh\u00ebt e fundit po merrnin me tep\u00ebr terren.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Diplomacia izraelite duket se nuk iu ka shp\u00ebtuar k\u00ebtyre ndikimeve. Ajo, duke mos lexuar mir\u00eb ndikimin e vatrave t\u00eb tjera t\u00eb luft\u00ebs n\u00eb bot\u00eb, u gjend papritur brenda mjegull\u00ebs s\u00eb armiqve t\u00eb Izraelit, t\u00eb interesuar p\u00ebr t\u00eb hapur fronte t\u00eb reja konfliktesh. K\u00ebshtu, sh\u00ebrbimi diplomatik izraelit duket se nuk pati v\u00ebm\u00ebndjen e duhur ndaj disa zhvillime t\u00eb koh\u00ebve t\u00eb fundit, si p\u00ebr shembull, ndaj deklarat\u00ebs s\u00eb Presidentit rus Putin, i cili dy dit\u00eb m\u00eb par\u00eb se t\u00eb shp\u00ebrthente lufta e Hamas kund\u00ebr Izraelit, pohoi: \u201cUkraina nuk mund t\u00eb mbijetonte p\u00ebr m\u00eb shum\u00eb se nj\u00eb jav\u00eb, pa ndihm\u00ebn ushtarake dhe financiare per\u00ebndimore.\u201d A nuk duhet t\u00eb ishte ky nj\u00eb sinjal i fort\u00eb edhe p\u00ebr diplomacin\u00eb e Izraelit p\u00ebr t\u00eb kuptuar se nj\u00eb konflikt i ri ka synim ta dob\u00ebsoj\u00eb ndihm\u00ebn e per\u00ebndimit ndaj shteteve demokratike t\u00eb p\u00ebrfshira n\u00eb luft\u00eb, si\u00e7 ka qen\u00eb vet\u00eb Izraeli historikisht? Gjithashtu, diplomacia izraelite, n\u00eb vitet e fundit, duket se ka vler\u00ebsuar vet\u00ebm an\u00ebn e ndrit\u00ebshme n\u00eb marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet m\u00eb disa shtete Arabe, si Bahrenin, Marokun, Sudanin, Emiratet e Bashkuara Arabe e deri me Arabin\u00eb Saudite, duke ulur, ndoshta, vigjilenc\u00ebn, ndaj shteteve si Irani, Jemeni, Siria dhe Iraku, historikisht armiq t\u00eb Izraelit. Q\u00ebllimet e k\u00ebtyre shteteve dhe lidhja e tyre me organizatat terroriste, t\u00eb cilat q\u00ebndrojn\u00eb n\u00eb k\u00ebmb\u00eb vet\u00ebm p\u00ebr veprime ushtarake kund\u00ebr Izraelit, nuk flasin p\u00ebr shtensionim dhe paqe, por p\u00ebr luft\u00eb dhe terror. Nd\u00ebrsimi i bot\u00ebs Arabe kund\u00ebr Izraelit ka q\u00ebn\u00eb synimi strategjik i k\u00ebtyre vendeve dhe organizatave terroriste.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Po n\u00eb pik\u00ebpamje ushtarake, a mund t\u00eb pranohet n\u00ebnvleft\u00ebsimi i Hamasit nga ana e Izraelit? Pothuajse nj\u00eb muaj m\u00eb par\u00eb nga sulmi terrorist i 7 tetorit, fraksionet e armatosura palestineze n\u00eb Gaza kan\u00eb zhvilluar st\u00ebrvitjen e koduar \u201cK\u00ebndi i Fort\u00eb Nr.4\u201d. Ideja e st\u00ebrvitjes p\u00ebrmbante pushtimin e Jaff\u00ebs, Naif\u00ebzit dhe Jeruzalemit. P\u00ebr shp\u00ebrthimin e \u201cMurit t\u00eb Hekurt\u201d dhe dep\u00ebrtimin n\u00eb territorin e Izraelit, b\u00ebheshin prova me p\u00ebrdorim dinamiti, me angazhin e fuqis\u00eb s\u00eb zjarrit t\u00eb t\u00eb gjitha llojeve t\u00eb arm\u00ebve, me p\u00ebrdorimin e mjeteve t\u00eb r\u00ebnda si zetor\u00eb, traktor\u00eb, etj. Disa nga skenar\u00ebt e k\u00ebsaj st\u00ebrvitjeje u zbatuan me sakt\u00ebsi n\u00eb luft\u00ebn e 7 tetorit. Bazat ku st\u00ebrviteshin terrorist\u00ebt ishin rreth 350 metra nga vija e kufirit me Izraelin dhe, nuk ishte nj\u00eb, por gjasht\u00eb t\u00eb tilla, ku strehoheshin nj\u00ebsit\u00eb luftarake, armatimi dhe mjetet e luft\u00ebs! P\u00ebrdorimi i droneve ishin nj\u00eb dukuri e zakon\u00ebshme nga forcat ushtarake t\u00eb Hamasit. Filmime nga st\u00ebrvitje t\u00eb tilla thuhet se jan\u00eb dh\u00ebn\u00eb edhe n\u00eb kanalin televiziv amerikan NBC. Nj\u00eb video-mesazh p\u00ebr k\u00ebt\u00eb st\u00ebrvitje e ka shp\u00ebrndar\u00eb edhe vet\u00eb Hamasi, ku demonstronte forc\u00ebn dhe paralajm\u00ebronte katastrof\u00eb.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Faktet q\u00eb tregonin p\u00ebrgatitjen e Hamasit p\u00ebr luft\u00eb e terror jan\u00eb t\u00eb shumta. Nga ana tjet\u00ebr, tanim\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb fakt q\u00eb kund\u00ebrveprimi nga organet e siguris\u00eb e t\u00eb mbrojtjes s\u00eb Izraelit \u00e7aloi. U kap\u00ebn n\u00eb befasi strategjike, q\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb e v\u00ebshtir\u00eb t\u00eb pranohet, apo se k\u00ebto struktura p\u00ebrpunonin dhe hartonin plane e kurthe t\u00eb tjera ndaj armikut t\u00eb tyre? K\u00ebto l\u00ebn\u00eb hap\u00ebsir\u00eb p\u00ebr diskutim. Aktualisht, po shohim se Izraeli po zbaton nj\u00eb skenar \u201cfshirjeje\u201d nga faqja e dheut. Ndoshta, ideja strategjike p\u00ebr t\u2019i lar\u00eb hesapet me terrorist\u00ebt nj\u00ebher\u00eb e mir\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb e motivuar, por kurrsesi me nj\u00eb kosto t\u00eb till\u00eb njer\u00ebzore.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Nd\u00ebshkimi i plot\u00eb i terrorist\u00ebve t\u00eb Hamasit, por edhe i \u00e7do terrorizmi tjet\u00ebr, \u00ebsht\u00eb i justifikuar. Sidoqoft\u00eb, tejkalimi i t\u00eb drejt\u00ebs, ve\u00e7an\u00ebrisht n\u00eb koh\u00eb lufte, ka rrezik t\u00eb t\u00eb \u00e7oj\u00eb n\u00eb shkeljen e vet\u00eb t\u00eb drejt\u00ebs, dometh\u00ebn\u00eb t\u00eb ligjeve t\u00eb luft\u00ebs dhe t\u00eb drejtave t\u00eb njeriut. Nj\u00eb populli t\u00eb shum\u00ebvuajtur nga pogromet e nazizmit dhe terrorit, nuk i shkon hakmarrja e verb\u00ebr pa dallim. Populli i Izraelit, aq i pasur me kultur\u00eb, histori dhe legjenda, me siguri se do t\u00eb mbaj\u00eb parasysh \u00e7ka thoshte Eskili, se teprimi i mbrojtjes t\u00eb s\u00eb drejt\u00ebs t\u00ebnde mund t\u00eb \u00e7oj\u00eb n\u00eb padrejt\u00ebsi ose n\u00eb transferimin e s\u00eb drejt\u00ebs tek armiku yt.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Ajo q\u00eb ka b\u00ebr\u00eb m\u00eb tep\u00ebr p\u00ebrshtypie n\u00eb konfliktin mes Izraelit dhe Hamas-it, n\u00eb Rripin e Gaz\u00ebs, nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb lufta mes tyre, por befasia me t\u00eb cil\u00ebn nisi ajo. Shteti i Izraelit ka lindur, \u00ebsht\u00eb mbrojtur dhe zhvilluar p\u00ebrmes luftrave me shtetet e rajonit. Kjo nuk p\u00ebrb\u00ebn ndonj\u00eb gj\u00eb t\u00eb re. Ajo q\u00eb ka t\u00ebrhequr [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":22608,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[40],"tags":[872],"class_list":["post-30429","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-aktualitet","tag-agron-berdaj"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/intervista.al\/web\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/30429","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/intervista.al\/web\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/intervista.al\/web\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/intervista.al\/web\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/5"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/intervista.al\/web\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=30429"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/intervista.al\/web\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/30429\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/intervista.al\/web\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/22608"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/intervista.al\/web\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=30429"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/intervista.al\/web\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=30429"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/intervista.al\/web\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=30429"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}